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1. Introduction 
In this paper we develop and apply a particular empirical modeling framework to analyze the behavior 
of women in the urban Eritrean labor market. We focus on the behavior of women with respect to 
three labor market states, namely “employed in the wage sector”, “being self-employed”, and “not 
employed”. Since women constitute the largest labor reservoir in the country, and have in general a 
low economic activity level, understanding the factors affecting women’s labor supply is urgent for 
identifying policy measures that may increase local production capacity and economic growth. 
 Traditional models of labor supply rely on the assumption that hours of work can be supplied 
freely in the labor market at a given (equilibrium) worker-specific wage rate. Thus, this type of model 
abstracts from the fact that an important aspect of the labor market is the notion of “job”, which 
represents the activity associated with the production process, and which may be costly to create and 
destroy. A realistic modeling framework for behavior in the labor market should take into account that 
an important aspect of labor market behavior consists of choosing between feasible jobs. However, 
this challenge is by no means a simple one. First, it is hardly possible to give a simple and observable 
representation of the job dimension of the labor market. Second, the (equilibrium) individual sets of 
feasible jobs are in general not observable to the econometrician. Third, rationing may be present such 
that there may be excess supply in some markets and excess demand in others. To take into account 
this type of market failure in developing countries may be even more crucial than in developed 
economies as labor markets may be more segmented.  
 In the literature a number of authors have analyzed labor supply in developing countries 
within a three-sector framework. Examples are Heckman and Sedlacek (1990), Magnac (1991), 
Gindling (1991), Newman and Gertler (1994), Tiefenthaler (1994, 1999), and Pradham and van Soest 
(1995, 1997). Some of these authors allow for rationing and market segmentation. For example, 
Magnac (1991) assumes that agents must wait and face costs of entry into the wage sector. The costs 
are assumed to be proportional to wage rates and can therefore be accounted for in the same way as 
linear taxes. Pradham and van Soest (1997) use a similar approach but interpret non-wage factors that 
influence sector participation as non-monetary returns. Newman and Gertler (1994) and Pradham and 
van Soest (1997) analyze both choice of sector as well as hours of work allocation given sector, while 
the other authors mentioned above only analyze choice of sector.  
 Similarly to most of the papers mentioned above we have in this paper adopted a modeling 
framework based on the concepts and techniques developed within the tradition of random utility 
models. In contrast to the specification of conventional demand for continuous quantities, the tradition 
of random utility models departs from an explicit stochastic representation of preferences. As is well 
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known, the motivation for the stochastic terms in the preference function is to allow for taste-shifters 
that are unobserved by the econometrician and therefore are perceived as random to him. A great 
advantage of the random utility framework is that it allows researchers, both to model unobserved 
taste variation and to take into account unobserved choice sets of market opportunities.  
 Theoretically, our point of departure is static neoclassical theory in which agents, in addition 
to having preferences over leisure and consumption, also have preferences over non-pecuniary 
attributes of the jobs in the wage sector and maximize utility under appropriate budget constraints and 
(latent) choice sets of feasible market opportunities. Also the wage rates in the wage sector are 
allowed to depend on latent job characteristics. Under particular assumptions about the distribution of 
the unobservables, we derive a probabilistic model (choice probabilities) for agents' choice behavior. 
This model is a function of parameters that represent the distribution of preferences, budget constraints 
and “aggregate” latent choice opportunities. This modeling framework therefore seems convenient for 
accommodating the notion of rationing in the sense that there are restrictions on the set of job 
opportunities. Specifically, in accordance with the “dualistic approach” (see Mazumdar, 1977 and 
1989, Pradhan, 1995, Rosenzweig, 1988, and House, 1992) we allow for constrained choice sets of job 
opportunities resulting from excess supply of labor to the wage sector where wages are relatively high 
and often regulated, whereas supply and demand of labor determine returns (marginal profit) in the 
self-employment sector composed mainly of small family-based enterprises. For simplicity, we only 
derive a model that corresponds to data on “corner solutions”, represented by observations on 
participation in the three labor market states mentioned above. Examples of analogous modeling 
approaches that account for latent choice sets can be found in Ben-Akiva et al. (1985), Dagsvik (1994) 
and Aaberge et al. (1995). The present approach is, however, simpler and less general than the one 
proposed in Aaberge et al. (1995)
1
.  
 To summarize; the methodological contribution of this paper that distinguishes it from the 
other papers mentioned above is twofold: First, we develop a particular approach to accommodate the 
notion of latent market opportunities with non-pecuniary aspects that affect the agents’ utility 
functions. Second, we derive the corresponding choice probabilities of the observable choices. Since it 
follows from theory that an agent may choose to work in both sectors (unless marginal returns to self-
employment is constant), we derive the corresponding choice probability of working in both sectors.
2
 
                                                     
1 It would have been desirable to establish an equilibrium framework in which the rationing mechanism is explained, but this 
is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
2 As far as we know, the derivation of this type of joint choice probability is new. 
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 The empirical analysis is based on a sample of micro-data from the 1996/97 urban Eritrean 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (EHIES). Our data contain observations on whether or not 
a woman is constrained in her labor market choice, and this information is utilized when estimating 
the sector participation probabilities. After the parameters of the model have been estimated it is 
possible to perform policy simulations on labor market behavior, such as for example the effect of 
changes in the wage rate or the effect of changes in the education level. In particular, it is possible to 
assess the separate effect of education on labor supply through the wage rate and the profit function, 
and on actual employment through parameters that represent mean choice opportunities (and which 
depend on education). 
 The paper it organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the data and the policy relevance of 
this study in the social and economic context of Eritrea. In Section 3 we develop the theoretical model, 
and Section 4 discusses the empirical specification. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and in 
Section 6 we discuss selected policy simulation experiments. 
2. Context and relevance 
The Eritrean population is characterized by a marked lack of adults, and in particular of adult men, as 
a result of war and labor migration (Arneberg and Pedersen, 2001, National Statistics Office, 1997). 
The high dependency burden, with more than half the population being children or elderly in some 
regions, is worsened by a general low economic activity rate among the working age population. Only 
51 per cent of the adult urban population is in the labor force, of which 71 per cent are men and 36 per 
cent are women (Table 2.1). With an unemployment rate at 21 per cent, this means that every working 
adult has to provide for 3 dependants. Accordingly, only 61 per cent of the households have income 
from employment as their main income source (Table 2.2). As there is no publicly provided social 
safety net, the remaining households live on transfer income from family elsewhere in Eritrea or 
abroad. 
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Table 2.1. Summary characteristics of the adult urban population with age between 15-65, by 
sex and marital status (source: EHIES 1996/97) 
 Women 
. All adults Men 
All Married Widowed Divorced 
Never 
married 
Population (1000 persons) 270 114 156 70 17  18  51  
Per cent of population in age group 
15-65 
100 42 58 26 6  7  19
 
Illiteracy rate (per cent) 28 13 40 48 71  55  12  
Labor force (LF) participation rate 
(per cent) 51 71 36 25
 
39 
 
 
65 
 
40
 
Wage employment rate (per cent of 
LF) 
51 55 46 45 38  47  48
 
Self-employment rate (per cent of 
LF)* 
28 25 31 32 41  35  24
 
Unemployment rate (per cent of LF) 21 19 24 23 20  19  28  
Mean usual working hours, the 
employed 
51 51 52 50 49  52  54
 
Mean wage rate, employees (US$ per 
hour) 
0.37 0.43 0.27 0.39 0.24  0.29  0.19
 
* Includes workers in family business. 
 
The low general activity rate, and the large, potential contribution by women, makes it urgent to 
identify factors that contribute to women’s labor force participation. Standard models for 
understanding female labor supply recognize that women’s decisions to enter the labor market to a 
much larger extent than men’s decisions are intertwined with other factors than those pertaining to 
productivity, welfare benefits, and the functioning of the labor market. (See for example, 
Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, Clark and York, 1999, Gustafsson, 1995, Frank and Wong, 1990.) 
Childbearing as well as social norms governing the different roles of men and women regarding 
income provision for the family has demanded a focus on interaction between household members in 
order to understand why women enter the labor market or not. (See for example Schultz, 1990.) 
 Empirical evidence, especially the second generation models which explicitly deal with the 
methodological problems arising from the large amount of non-supply among women, suggest that 
women’s labor supply is more responsive to wage incentives than that of men. (See Killingsworth and 
Heckman, 1986.) Although women have lower wages than men, education often tends to have a 
larger, positive impact on women’s wages, and so female labor force participation rates are more 
responsive to education than those of men. Evidence on the effect of non-labor income on female 
labor supply is more varied and inconclusive, and several studies suggest that exogenous income 
elasticities are near zero (cf. Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, pp. 189-192). Women’s labor force 
participation is elastic with regard to child-care subsidies, and fertility seems to have a negative impact 
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on both labor force participation and wages in high-income countries, but to a lesser extent in low-
income countries. A U-shaped relationship between economic development and female labor force 
participation is explained by male bias in access to education and the presence of significant negative 
income effects in low-income countries, combined with the availability of white-collar jobs in the 
services sector coupled with fertility decline and equal access to education in high-income countries 
(cf. Goldin, 1995). 
 Although there are several studies on female labor supply in low-income countries it is still 
of interest to analyze the Eritrean case. This is motivated by the large variation in results from studies 
of female labor supply, which indicates that there are substantial country- and culture-specific 
differences in determinants that need to be investigated in order to formulate appropriate policies (cf. 
Clark and York, 1999). 
 An additional motivating factor for this study stems from the demographic composition of 
the urban population, where less than half of all adult women are married (Table 2.1). Thus, existing 
evidence on female labor supplywhich is mainly focused on married womenis of less relevance in 
the Eritrean case. The literature on the relationship between labor force participation and marital status 
shows that the relationship may go in both directions: According to Becker (1985), increased relative 
earnings of women should diminish the returns to specialization within the household and thus reduce 
the incentives to remain married. However, Johnson and Skinner (1986) find the opposite 
causality―that higher divorce probability leads to higher labor force participation. Johnson and 
Skinner (1988) and World Bank (1980) find that marital status is a main determinant of female 
economic activity. An explanation for this may be “supply-side discrimination”―that married women 
have less autonomy than divorced or widowed women, and that husbands deny wives to enter the 
labor market in fear of losing bargaining power within the household (Braunstein, 2000, see also 
Boserup, 1995). To account for the impact of marital status on economic activity, the estimation of 
supply-side factors in section 5 is done separately for women according to their marital status. 
 The demographic composition of the population and the resulting high number of female-
headed households in urban Eritrea (Table 2.2) adds another policy relevant dimension to the study of 
women’s economic activity, namely poverty reduction. In many countries female-headed households 
are often―though not alwaysat great risk economically (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997, Folbre, 1995, 
Kennedy and Peters, 1992, Rogers, 1995). Arneberg (1999a) shows that in Eritrea, divorced and 
widowed women with young children have a high risk of being poor, and that divorced women are 
largely depending on their own labor for income provision, whereas widows depend on assistance 
from relatives and other households (see also Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2. Summary characteristics of urban households. By sex and marital status of main 
income provider
*
 (source: EHIES 1996/97) 
  Female main provider 
  
All 
house-
holds 
Male 
main 
provider Total Married
** Widowe
d 
Divorced 
Never 
married 
Number of households (1000) 115 65 50 16 13  13  8
Per cent of all households 100 56 44 14 12  11  7
0 31 17 48 59 59  33  33
1 47 55 37 26 25  54  52
2 or more 22 27 14 14 16  13  15
Number of 
employed 
household 
members. 
Per cent 
Total 100 100 100 100 100  100  100
Wage employment 44 56 28 21 21  37  41
Self-employment 17 19 16 13 16  21  14
Other 39 25 56 66 63  42  45
Main income 
source 
Per cent 
Total 100 100 100 100 100  100  100
Mean annual household income 
(nominal US$) 
1675 2022 1225 1361 1109  930  1573
Dependency ratio*** 0.84 0.83 0.86 1.19 0.79  0.74  0.47
*  Main income provider is the household head (by own definition) if the household head is employed or if 
there are no other employed persons in the household. If the self-defined household head is not employed and 
another household member is employed, then this latter person is selected as main income provider. 48 per 
cent of the households are female-headed (own definition), whereas 44 per cent have female main income 
provider. 
**  Widows, divorcees and single women are considered de jure head of household, and the married female 
family providers de facto household heads, as the husband is commonly away on labor migration (for more 
than 3 months) and may be the main income source for the household although he is not present in the 
household and as such not a household member. 
***  Number of children below 15 and elderly above 65 as a share of number of working age people (15-65 years 
of age). 
 
Although analysis of labor supply is relevant for forming policy measures, it is also important to 
consider disequilibrium effects that may lead to rationing. Despite efforts by the government to 
promote more gender equality, women are disadvantaged in the Eritrean society (World Bank, 1994, 
Bakhuisen, 1998). According to Table 2.1 the majority (55 per cent) of the female labor force is 
outside the formal wage sector as unemployed or self-employed, compared to 44 per cent for men. The 
high female self-employment rate is typical for developing countries (Standing, 1999). Among the 
wage employees, the male wage rate is 60 per cent above the female rate. The poor status of women in 
the labor market is partly due to their low levels of education. A high 40 per cent of urban women are 
illiterate compared to a rate of 13 per cent for men. However, there is also gender discrimination in the 
labor market. Arneberg (1999b) found that female wage employees earn 37 per cent less than males 
when education and experience is controlled for. Therefore, the weak position of women in the 
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Eritrean labor market makes it urgent to identify policy measures by which women’s job opportunities 
may be expanded and their wages increased.  
2.2 Data applied in the empirical analysis 
The data are based on the 1996/97 urban Eritrean Household Income and Expenditure Survey (EHIES) 
of 5,000 households representing the total population of half a million people in the 12 major towns in 
Eritrea. It is the first survey in Eritrea ever to collect economic data from households. As there was no 
usable sample frame in Eritrea at the time of the survey, all towns were mapped and the sample was 
drawn as a one stage stratified sample. Sample inclusion probabilities differ from relatively low 
probabilities for households from the densely populated Highland area (which was under-sampled), to 
higher probabilities for households in the Lowland areas. Sample weights are therefore applied in all 
descriptive tables (unless indicated otherwise), and in the policy simulations presented in Section 6.  
 The field work was conducted in four rounds covering one calendar year in order to capture 
seasonal variation, and all selected households were kept in the sample in all rounds. The response rate 
is 96 per cent. To avoid problems associated with serial dependence in the data we have only used the 
subsample obtained from one round to estimate the model. 
 Much of the information in the survey is collected by the use of retrospective questions. For 
labor force questions the reference period was the week preceding the interview. The definition of 
employment is based on the one-hour criterion of economic activity during the reference week, 
following the guidelines of ILO (ILO, 1990). The questionnaire is designed so as to be able to capture 
activity in the self-employment sector, in particular among women. Data on working hours and wages 
are collected both in “usual” and “actual” terms. The present analysis is based on data on “actual” 
monthly wage and “actual” weekly hours of work during the week prior to the interview.  
 Women below 20 years of age were excluded from the sample to avoid the problem of 
interaction between labor supply and education demand. Also, women above 60 years of age were 
excluded. We originally had 4423 observations of women 20-60 years of age in the sample, of which 8 
were removed due to numerical problems. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics of the explanatory 
variables for the sample used in the estimation. 
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Table 2.3. Summary statistics of the sample. Women 20-60 years of age 
. Mean 
unweighted
Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Weighted
mean
* 
Age (years) 35.42 11.5 20.00 60.00 36.04
Number of children under 5 0.55 0.8 0.00 4.00 0.51
Education (years) 2.96 4.0 0.00 16.00 3.65
Experience (number of years since 
school) 
25.46 13.6 0.00 53.00 25.400
Experience square 837.52 776.7 0.00 2809.00 849.38
Regional unemployment rate  
(per cent) 
18.70 3.5 12.68 22.58 19.86
Log annual non labor income (Nakfa) 7.03 2.7 1.28 12.81 7.49
Annual non-labor income (Nakfa) 5470.26 11034.4 3.60 367453.84 7488.40
Log wage rate (Nakfa) 0.26 0.9 -1.95 3.80 0.34
Wage rate (Nakfa) 1.91 2.5 0.14 44.67 2.05
Moslem dummy   0.35 0 1 0.23
Liberation army fighter dummy  0.06 0 1 0.06
No education dummy 0.55 0 1 0.49
Incomplete basic education dummy 
(1-6 years) 
0.24 0 1 0.24
Complete basic education dummy  
(7 years) 
0.14 0 1 0.17
Secondary education dummy  
(13-16 years) 
0.06 0 1 0.08
Post secondary education dummy  0.01  0.02
Husband present dummy 0.42 0 1 0.41
Married dummy  0.60 0 1 0.58
Widowed dummy 0.12 0 1 0.12
Divorced dummy 0.15 0 1 0.13
Never married dummy 0.14 0 1 0.17
Fraction unemployed 0.08 0 1 0.09
Fraction not in the labor force 0.61 0 1 0.60
Fraction employed, wage sector 0.15 0 1 0.18
Fraction employed, self-employment 0.16 0 1 0.14
Number of observations 4415  
*
 Sample inclusion probabilities are adjusted for non-response. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
In this section we present the essential elements of the theoretical framework which underlies the 
empirical model to be specified and estimated later. 
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 We consider labor market behavior with respect to three sectors, namely “wage work” 
(Sector 1) and “self-employment” (Sector 2). For expository simplicity we denote “non-employment” 
as Sector 3. Consider an arbitrary agent. She/he has the choice between a number of feasible jobs in 
Sector 1 (this number may for some agents be very small) and a self-employment activity in Sector 2. 
Let M denote the set of job opportunities in Sector 1 that are feasible to the agent. Specifically, j M∈  
index the job opportunities.  
 Let ( )* 1 2U C, ,hh  denote the utility of consumption C and a vector ( )1 11 12 1Mh ,h ,...,h=h , of 
hours of work associated with the available jobs in Sector 1 and hours of work h2 in Sector 2. Let 
( )2F h  denote the conditional profit function associated with self-employment activity, given input of 
hours of work equal to h2. Let Wj be the wage rate associated with job j M∈ . Let J denote the chosen 
job, and let 
1
h%  and 
2
h%  denote the chosen hours of work in Sector 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
 Assumption 1 
 The utility function ( )* 1 2U C, ,hh  has the structure 
 ( )
∈
 
= +  
 
∑
1j*
1 2 2
j M 1j
h
U C, ,h U C, h
b
h  
where U(C,h) is a function that is quasi-concave, differentiable, increasing in C and decreasing in h 
and b 01j > , ∈j M , are random variables that account for unobservable non-pecuniary aspects of the 
jobs. 
 
 Assumption 1 means that a decrease in utility as a result of an unattractive job attribute can 
be perfectly compensated through a decreased workload. 
 
 Assumption 2 
 The function ( )2F h  is differentiable, strictly increasing and concave for ( )∈2h 0,T , where 
T is total hours available for work. 
 
 Assumption 2 means that profit maximum will not be attained within the interval of feasible 
hours. This assumption is made for convenience and could easily be relaxed. Specifically, in the 
empirical application below data turns out to be consistent with a linear specification of F. 
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 Consider now the agent’s optimization problem. His problem is to maximize 
 
1j
2
j M 1j
h
U C, h
b
∈
 
+  
 
∑  
with respect to C, { }1jh , h2, 1jh 0≥ , 2h 0≥ , 
(3.1) ( )1j j 2
j M
C h W F h y
∈
= + +∑  
and 
(3.2) 1j 2
j M
h h T
∈
+ ≤∑ , 
where y is non-labor income. With 1j 1j 1jx h b= , we realize that the above optimization problem is 
equivalent to maximizing 
 1j 2
j M
U C, x h
∈
 
+ 
 
∑  
subject 1jx 0≥ , 2h 0≥ , 
(3.3) ( )1j j 1j 2
j M
C x Wb F h y
∈
= + +∑  
and 
(3.4) 1j 1j 2
j M
b x h T
∈
+ ≤∑ . 
Note that { }1jx , j M∈  enter symmetrically in the utility function. Hence, the optimizing agent will, in 
the case she prefers an interior solution in Sector 1, choose to allocate working hours solely in one job, 
namely in the job that maximizes j 1jWb , j M∈ . Thus, the chosen job J is determined as 
(3.5) ( )j 1j
j M
J Argmax W b
∈
= . 
Let 
(3.6) ( )j 1j
j M
W max Wb
∈
=
% . 
13 
We now realize that the chosen hours of work in the sectors are determined by 
1 1 1J
h x b=% %  and 
2
h% , 
where 
1
x%  and 
2
h%  are found by maximizing ( )1 2U C,x h+  subject to 1x 0≥ , 2h 0≥ ,  
(3.7) ( )1 2C x W F h y= + +%  
and 
(3.8) 
1 1J 2
x b h T+ ≤ . 
We can interpret 
1
x%  as the adjusted workload in Sector 1. That is, 
1
x%  is the workload that corresponds 
to the case where all jobs in M have equal non-pecuniary attributes. The corresponding modified wage 
rates are j 1jWb  for j M∈ . Therefore, the chosen job has modified wage rate W
% .  
 The reservation wage that corresponds to the optimization problem above is defined by
3
 
(3.9) 
( )
( )
2
R
1
U y,0
W :
U y,0
= −  
where 
1
U ( )⋅  and 
2
U ( )⋅  denote the respective partial derivative of U( )⋅ . 
 From the assumptions above we can derive the following result by straight forward analysis. 
 
 Proposition 1 
 Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the agent will not work if 
(3.10) ( )( )′> %RW max F 0 ,W . 
If 
(3.11) ( ) ( )( )RF 0 W max F T ,W′ ′> >%  
the agent will work in both sectors. If 
(3.12) ( )( )′>% RW max W ,F 0  
the agent will work solely in Sector 1. Finally, if 
                                                     
3 Recall that the notation, :=, in an equation means that the left hand side is defined by the relation. 
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(3.13) ( ) ( )′ ′> > > >% %R RF 0 W W or F T W W  
the agent will work solely in Sector 2. 
 
 The first inequality, (3.10), says that the reservation wage is greater than the modified wage 
rate W%  and the marginal profit at zero hours in Sector 2. In this case it is evidently desirable not to 
work. Suppose next that (3.11) holds. Then it is desirable to work in both sectors since both the 
modified wage rate and the marginal profit evaluated at zero hours are greater than the reservation 
wage. Moreover, the modified wage rate is greater than the profit at the maximum hours of work T, 
which ensures that it is not desirable to spend all available time working in Sector 2. The allocation of 
hours in Sector 2 is determined by ( )2W F h′= %% . If (3.12) holds the modified wage rate is greater than 
both the reservation wage and the marginal profit at zero hours which yields that it is desirable to work 
only in Sector 1. Consider next the case 
 ( ) RF 0 W W′ > > % , 
which states that the marginal profit at zero hours is greater than the reservation wage. Then it is 
desirable to work in Sector 2. It is not desirable to work in Sector 1 since the reservation wage is 
greater than the modified wage rate. Finally, consider the case 
 ( ) RF T W W′ > >%  
which means that the marginal profit at maximum hours is greater than the modified wage rate and the 
modified wage rate is greater than the reservation wage. But since also the marginal profit at 
maximum hours is greater than the modified wage rate it is desirable to spend all work effort in Sector 
2.  
 With suitable specification of the utility function U(⋅) one can obtain expressions for 
1
h%  and 
2
h%  that are tractable for empirical analysis. However, since we only deal with the sector participation 
decisions in the empirical analysis below, we shall not pursue this matter further here. 
 From the decision rule above it follows immediately that 
1
h 0>%  when 
(3.14) ( )( )RW max W ,F T .′>%  
Similarly, 
2
h 0>%  when 
15 
(3.15) ( )RF (0) max W,W .′ > %  
Recall that it is implicit in the formalism above that the set of feasible jobs and activities are accounted 
for since W%  depends on M. 
4. The empirical model 
A serious difficulty facing the researcher when he wishes to apply the framework above is that the 
structure of the preferences and many important variables are unobservable to her/him. In this section 
we shall discuss assumptions about the distribution of unobservables which will, subsequently, enable 
us to derive the empirical model. In the following X1, X2 and X3 will denote exogenous variables that 
affect the wage rates, the conditional profit function and the reservation wage, respectively. 
 
 Assumption 3 
 The wage rate satisfies the equation 
(4.1) = + *j 10 1 1jlogW + X 1α α ε  
where X1 is a vector of variables that capture the agent’s level of education and labor market 
experience and ( )α α10 1,  is a vector of coefficients. 
 The conditional profit function F has the structure 
(4.2) ( ) ( )= +2 2 2 2 2log F h log g h + X α ε  
where X2 is a vector of variables that affect the returns to self-employment activity, α2 is a vector of 
coefficients and ( )2g h  is a deterministic function that is strictly increasing, differentiable and 
concave. 
 Furthermore, the taste shifters { }, ∈1jb j M  are random variables that have distribution that 
does not depend on X1, X2, X3. Similarly, { }, ∈*1j j Mε  and ε2 are random variables with joint 
distribution that does not depend on X1, X2, X3. 
 
 The wage equation postulated in Assumption 3 serves two purposes. First it provides an 
instrumental relation that can be applied to account for the possible endogeneity problem in the labor 
supply relation that follows from Assumption 1. Second, the wage equation also serves to “solve” the 
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missing variable problem that is due to the fact that only the wage rate of the chosen job is observed. 
The motivation for eq. (4.2) is analogous. 
 
 Assumption 4 
 The reservation wage (defined in (3.9)) has the structure 
(4.3) = γ +
R 0 3 3
logW + X γ ε  
where X3 is a vector of variables that affect the agent’s reservation wage (including non-labor income) 
while ε
3
 is a random term with distribution that does not depend on X1, X2, X3,. and ( ),0γ γ  is a 
vector of coefficients. 
 
 From (4.1) and (4.2) it follows that 
(4.4) ( )j 1j 10 1 1 1 1jlog W b d X= α + + α + ε  
and 
(4.5) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2logF h logg h X′ ′= + α + ε  
where d1 is the mean of 1jlogb , j M∈ , and { }1j , j Mε ∈  are random variables defined by 
(4.6) *1j 1j 1 1j: logb dε = − + ε . 
It now only remains to specify the distribution of the random terms { }1j , j Mε ∈ , ε2 and ε3, in order to 
obtain a model for the choice of sector.  
 
 Assumption 5 
 The distribution of preferences is such that the probability of choosing a job or self-
employment satisfy the “Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives”, property (IIA). 
 
 Assumption 5 means the following: Consider the agent’s choice from a subset of mutually 
exclusive jobs and the self-employment alternative. Without loss of generality one can view the choice 
process as taking place in two stages. In the first stage a subset of the most attractive alternatives is 
selected, while in the second stage the most preferred alternative is selected from this subset. The 
crucial content of the IIA assumption is that only the subset selected in the first stage matters for the 
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choice in the second stage, i.e., the alternatives discarded in the first stage are “irrelevant”. For a 
discussion on the interpretation and limitation of IIA we refer to Domencich and McFadden (1975). 
 From Assumption 5 and the additive structure (4.1) and (4.2) one can derive the structure of 
the distribution of the preferences. It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 below that IIA implies that 
the random error terms { }1j 2 3, j M, ,ε ∈ ε ε  can with no loss of generality, be chosen to be i.i.d. with 
extreme value c.d.f. ( )( )exp exp x− − θ , where 0θ >  is a scale parameter that has the interpretation 
(4.7) 
2
1j 2k 3 2
Var Var Var
6
π
ε = ε = ε =
θ
. 
 
 Theorem 1 
 Let m be the number of jobs in M. Assumptions 1 to 5 imply that  
(4.8) ( ) ( )( )
v
vv v
: ′= = = > =
+ +
% % %
3
31 2
1 2 R
e
P h h 0 P W max F (0 ),W ,
me e e
 
(4.9) ( ) ( )( )( )
v
vv v
:
+
′> = > =
+ +
% %
1
31 2
1 R
me
P h 0 P W max W ,F T ,
me e e
κ
 
(4.10) ( ) ( )( )
v
2 vv v
: ( ) , ,
2
31 2
R
e
P h 0 P F 0 max W W
me e e
′> = > =
+ +
% %  
(4.11) 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )vv
v vv v v v
, : ( ) ,
,
1
2
3 31 2 1 2
1 2 R
P h 0 h 0 P F 0 W max F T W
me 1 ee
me e e me e e
κ
κ+
′ ′> > = > >
−
= ⋅
+ + + +
% % %
 
(4.12) ( ) ( )( )
v
vv v
, : , ( ) ,
1
31 2
1 2 R
me
P h 0 h 0 P W max W F 0
me e e
′> = = > =
+ +
% % %  
and 
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(4.13) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
vv v v
v v v vv v v v v v
, : ( )
,
32 2 1
3 3 3 31 2 1 1 2 1
1 2 R R
P h 0 h 0 P F 0 W W F T W W
e e e me
me e e me e me e e me e
κ
κ
+
+
′ ′= > = > > ∪ > >
= ⋅ + ⋅
+ + + + + +
% % % %
 
where ( )v :1 10 1 0 1 1d X ,θ α γ α θ= + − +  ( )( )v :2 0 2 2log g 0 X ,θ γ α θ′= − +  v :3 3X ,γ θ=  
( ) ( ): log g T log g 0κ θ θ′ ′= −  and > 0θ  is a constant. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. 
 
 In the special case where g(x) is linear we get that the conditional marginal profit function 
does not depend on hours. In this case we expect that the agent will work at most in one sector. From 
(4.11) in Theorem 1 we realize that this is indeed the case because when ( )2g h  is linear it follows that 
0κ =  which yields that the probability of working jointly in both sectors is zero. 
 There are several interesting features of the model represented in Theorem 1 which 
distinguishes it from the traditional approach. First, this model allows for the notion that a worker’s 
choice set may consist of jobs, which differ with respect to wage rates as well as unobservable non-
pecuniary attributes, over which the worker has preferences. Second, it enables us to represent the 
choice opportunities the worker faces in Sector 1 through an aggregate index m, which can be 
interpreted as the number of market opportunities in Sector 1 that are available to the agent. Third, it 
departs from the standard discrete choice setting in that alternatives are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
 Although m is not directly observable they can be specified as functions of variables that 
affect the opportunity sets such as in Assumption 6 below. 
 
 Assumption 6 
 The number of opportunities in M has the structure 
(4.14) =
0 4
log m + Xδ δ  
where ( ),0δ δ  is a vector of parameters and X4 is a vector of variables that affect the set of choice 
opportunities.  
 
 Due to qualification requirements and sticky wages there may be excess supply to Sector 1. 
For example, lack of suitable skills may prevent a worker from being hired since the worker must be 
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found acceptable to the employer before he will be hired. Thus, it is of substantial interest to separate 
households’ preferences for work in Sector 1, conditional on the respective wage rates, from the 
preferences of the employers.  
 When (4.14) is inserted into (4.7), (4.9), (4.11) and (4.12) we obtain 
(4.15) ( )
1 1 2 2
00 1 2 Z Z
1
P : P h h 0 ,
1 e e
β β
= = = =
+ +
% %  
(4.16) ( )
2 2
1 1 2 2
Z
2 Z Z
e
P h 0
1 e e
β
β β
> =
+ +
%  
and 
(4.17) ( )
1 1
1 1 2 2
Z
10 1 2 Z Z
e
P : P h 0,h 0
1 e e
β
β β
= > = =
+ +
% % , 
(4.18) ( )
2 2 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
Z Z Z
01 1 2 Z Z Z Z Z Z
e 1 e e
P : P h 0,h 0
1 e e 1 e 1 e e 1 e
β β +κ β
β β β β β +κ β
= = > = ⋅ + ⋅
+ + + + + +
% %  
where 
(4.19) 
1 1 10 0 4 1 1 3
Z : X X Xβ = θα + δ + δ + α θ − γθ%  
and 
(4.20) 
2 2 20 2 2 3
Z : X Xβ = θα + α θ − γθ% , 
where 
10 10 1 0
: dα = α + − γ%  and 
20 0
: logg (0)′α = − γ% . 
 Without further information it is not possible to identify the parameters δ0 and δ in (4.14). 
Fortunately, we have such information because the available data set contains information about 
whether or not each agent is rationed in Sector 1. The question asked in the survey to those who do not 
work is whether they wish to work if they were offered to work in Sector 1. This information can be 
used to identify and estimate the parameters in (4.14). 
 Let *M  denote the opportunity set of jobs when no rationing is present and let m
*
 be the 
number of opportunities in M*. The set M
*
 is a benchmark which we interpret as the total set of 
different types of jobs in the economy. Only a small number of jobs within M
*
 will, however, be of 
interest to a particular woman because she will in practice be offered low and unacceptable wages in 
most jobs since her skills may be relevant to only a small number of jobs. 
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 Let 
(4.21) * *
1 1 10 1 1 3
Z : X Xβ = θα + α θ − γθ% , 
where * 1 *
10 10
: logm−α = α + θ% % . The corresponding choice probabilities in this case with no rationing are 
found by replacing Z1β by Z1β
*
 in (4.15) to (4.18). In Appendix B we derive the full information 
maximum likelihood function including the case when data on individual rationing is available. 
 Next we shall consider the estimation of the wage equation (4.1). Since we only observe the 
wage rate for those who work we must take into account possible selection bias that stems from the 
fact that the random term in the wage equation may be correlated with the decision to work in Sector 
1. To this end we need the following result. 
 
 Lemma 1 
 Assume that Assumptions 3 to 5 hold. Then 
(4.22) ( ) ( )> = − >% %1J 1 1E h 0 log P h 0θε . 
 
 The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. 
 
 Let 
 ( )*1j 1j 1 1jE ε ε ≅ ρ θε  
be a first order Taylor approximation of ( )*1j 1jE ε ε . Then it follows readily that θρ1 has the 
interpretation 
 
( )*1j 1j
1
1j
Cov ,
Var
ε ε
θρ =
ε
. 
Hence, by Lemma 1 
(4.23) ( ) ( ) ( )*1J 1 1 1J 1 1 1E h 0 E h 0 logP h 0ε > ≅ ρ θε > = −ρ >% % % . 
From (4.23) it follows that 
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(4.24) ( )J 10 1 1 1 1 JlogW X logP h 0= α + α −ρ > + η%  
where η
J
is a random variable that has the property that 
 ( )J 1E h 0 0.η > =%  
Thus, if ( )1P h 0>%  were known one could estimate (4.24) consistently by OLS with X1 and 
( )1logP h 0>%  as independent variables. Thus, one can apply Heckman’s two stage estimation 
procedure (cf. Heckman, 1979) which in this case consists of estimating ( )1P h 0>%  in a first stage and 
estimating (4.24) in a second stage with the estimated value of ( )1logP h 0>%  as an additional 
explanatory variable to control for selectivity bias. 
 From the discussion above it is straight forward to verify that once ( )α α10 1,  and ( )α α20 2, , 
β β
1 2
,  and κ have been estimated it is possible to recover θ and δ. Even if the marginal conditional 
profit is not observed we realize that we can recover θ and α2 from the estimated choice probabilities 
and the wage equation. As a consequence, it is possible to compute elastisities for the choice 
probabilities (4.8) to (4.13) with respect to the wage rate and the marginal profit at zero hours of input. 
Furthermore, when δ has been estimated we are able to compute how changes in the unemployment 
rate or the level of education, ceteris paribus, affect the choice probabilities through the opportunity 
index m.  
5. Estimation results 
In this section we present the parameter estimates for the wage equation and for the choice 
probabilities obtained by the maximum likelihood procedure, as outlined in Appendix B. 
 In our subsample there are very few that work in both Sector 1 and Sector 2 (two women). 
Since there are so few in the sample that works in both sectors, we conclude that the probability that a 
woman shall work in both sectors is approximately equal to zero, which by (4.11) implies that the 
estimate of κ can be set equal to zero. The resulting choice probabilities and likelihood function are in 
this case given in Appendix B. 
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 To obtain estimates for the marginal effect of education on wages
4
 for the women in the 
sample, the wage equation given in (4.24) was estimated. Recall that the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the observed wage rate. The wage is assumed to be a function of the level of education, 
work experience, local unemployment rate and experience as a guerrilla soldier during the liberation 
war (fighter status). 
 Two different specifications of the wage equation are estimated. The first specification is the 
standard Mincer method (Mincer, 1974) where education is represented by years of schooling. The 
second specification is the “extended model” (Psacharopoulos, 1994) where schooling is represented 
by the level of educational attainment. In both specifications, a selection term is included to adjust for 
non-observable wages for those who do not work. Experience is defined as “potential work 
experience” which is the number of years since the individual left school. To account for possible 
declining marginal returns to experience, the logarithm of the wage rate is allowed to depend linearly 
on experience and squared experience. 
 
Table 5.1. Estimates of two specifications of the wage equation. Female wage employees 20-60 
years of age 
 Model 1 (standard Mincer) Model 2 (extended) 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Constant -1.019  -4.7  -0.899  -4.3
Education years 0.112  12.4    
Incomplete basic education  
(1-6 years) 
  
0.145  1.8
Completed basic education (7 years)   0.658  6.5
Completed secondary education  
(12 years) 
  
1.290  10.9
Post-secondary education  
(13-16 years) 
  
1.809  12.1
Experience · 10
-1 
0.454  4.8  0.478  5.0
Experience squared · 10
-2 
-0.050  -2.8  -0.065  -3.5
Regional unemployment rate -0.398  -0.5  -1.219  -1.5
Liberation army fighter 0.722  7.9  0.905  9.4
Selection term   -0.040  -0.8  -0.153  -2.9
Number of observations 626 626 
R
2
 0.32 0.34 
                                                     
4 As pointed out by Psacharopoulos (1994), it is better to use the term “marginal wage effects” than the commonly used term 
“private returns to education” as the latter necessitates taking into account the private cost of education (foregone labor 
income plus schooling expenses paid by the student). Chiswick (1997) discusses the unrealistic assumptions that are required 
in order to even interpret the coefficient as marginal effect on wage from schooling. 
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Table 5.1 displays the estimation results of the two specifications of the wage equation. All 
coefficients have the expected signs and most of them are highly statistically significant. Our results 
seem to be consistent with the results from other studies that find that wages in urban areas in Africa 
are depressed by higher levels of unemployment (see for example Hoddinott, 1996) although the 
coefficient associated with regional unemployment is hardly significant. We also find as expected that 
the marginal returns to experience are positive but declining, and that experience from the liberation 
army has a large positive impact on wages. The model is robust in the sense that the estimated 
coefficients associated with variables other than education are not affected much by changes in model 
specification. The only exception is the selection term, which is small and imprecisely estimated in the 
first model, but significantly negative in the second model. 
 The coefficient associated with “Education years” in Model 1 (the Mincer regression 
coefficient) shows that one additional year of education increases the wage by 11 per cent on average. 
This result is consistent with cross-country evidence where effects in low-income countries generally 
are found to be higher (10-13 per cent) than in middle- and high-income countries (4-8 per cent), and 
where effects are higher for women than for men in countries where women have less access to 
education than men (see Psacharopoulos, 1994, Bennell, 1996, Bils and Klenow, 2000, and Harmon et 
al., 2001, for an overview of comparative results). Compared to more recent evidence from Africa, our 
estimate is lower than the one estimated by Siphambe (2000) for Botswana (18 per cent in 1994/95) 
but higher than the ones estimated for Ghana by Glewwe (1996), (6 per cent for the government sector 
and insignificant for the private sector, men and women pooled) and the one estimated for Libya by 
Arabsheibani and Manfor (2001), (7 per cent, men and women pooled). 
 The specification applied in Model 1 yields the same effect on wage rates from, say, an 
increase of one year in primary school as an increase of one year at the university. This restriction may 
be unrealistic. Further, the policy relevance of the Mincer coefficients is not too evident since the 
education system is built on supplying blocks of education rather than years, and since individuals 
make decisions to enroll to a schooling cycle rather than to a single grade.  
 The estimated coefficients from the extended model show that basic school drop-outs on 
average get a 15 per cent wage premium compared to women who have not attended school at all (the 
reference group). The premium of completing basic schooling (grade 7) instead of dropping out is 67 
per cent, or 93 per cent compared to not attending school at all. The wage effect of leaving school after 
grade 12 with a completed secondary education is 263 per cent compared to not having any 
schooling―or 88 per cent more than for those leaving school after completing basic school. Post-
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secondary education gives a wage premium at 510 per cent compared to no schooling and 68 per cent 
more than for those quitting school after completing secondary level
5
. 
 A comparison of the results from the two different specifications shows that the log-linearity 
assumption underlying the simple Mincer method in Model 1 seems to slightly overestimate the 
effects of secondary education. The Mincer specification implies a wage effect of completed basic 
education of 119 per cent and of completed secondary education of 283 per cent. The corresponding 
effect of post-secondary schooling (16 years) is 500 per cent. When taking the standard errors of the 
coefficients into account we therefore conclude that the Models 1 and 2 yield approximately the same 
predictions. We have, however, chosen to rely on the extended model due to the fact that this model, 
as mentioned above, corresponds more closely to the schooling choices. In the estimation of choice 
probabilities we therefore use the extended model.  
 In principle, one could also apply data on the marginal returns to self-employment to 
estimate α2 similarly to the estimation of the wage equation. However, the data on self-employment 
income are questionable so we obtained the estimates of α2 indirectly through the estimates from the 
choice probabilities. As concerns the marginal profit equation for Sector 2 we cannot identify the 
constant term α20 without additional data. If we compare the results from the estimation of α2 in Table 
5.2 with the estimated wage equation we realize that the income effect of education is much higher in 
the wage sector than in the self-employment sector. For example, the marginal returns to self-
employment of increasing level of schooling from completed basic- to completed secondary schooling 
is 22 per cent, compared to 88 per cent for the wage sector. (That we did not succeed in establishing a 
significant effect of post-secondary education on self-employment profits is most likely due to the 
very few observations of women with post-secondary education who engage in self-employment 
activities.) 
 Having established the positive effect of education on wages and profits, we now turn to 
look at the effect on choices and opportunities regarding employment. In Table 5.2 we report 
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the choice probabilities
6
. The parameter estimates 
have the expected signs and most of them are determined very precisely. In Table 5.3 we report how 
well the model reproduces the aggregate fractions. The table shows that the model predicts the 
aggregate fractions rather well.  
                                                     
5 Persons with post-secondary education is a very heterogeneous group, where the length of education varies from 1-year 
diploma to a full Ph.D. As very few women in Eritrea have tertiary education, the few observations available makes it 
impossible to do a more detailed analysis of this group. 
6 The model was estimated both with and without a selection effect, but we report only the latter in Table 5.2. We found that 
when selection is not accounted for we underestimated the coefficient associated with the wage rate (q) for married women, 
while there appeared to be no selection effect for the other groups. As regards the remaining parameters the estimates 
suggested that the selection effect is negligible. 
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 The estimation of the parameters of the choice model associated with the choice of sector 
was done separately for groups of women according to their marital status. The motivation for this is 
the assumption that marital status is a proxy for autonomy, which affects a woman’s decision 
regarding whether to work or not. We a priori believe that divorced women have a high degree of 
autonomy since they commonly do not continue any relationship with their former in-laws. On the 
other extreme we expect to find married women, as they will usually not be able to take a job without 
acceptance from the husband. For married women we also include a dummy indicating whether the 
husband lives in the household or is away on labor migration, as we believe that an absentee husband 
increases the woman’s autonomy. Widowed women commonly continue to have a close relationship 
with the deceased husband’s family, and their degree of autonomy is a priori believed to be 
somewhere in between married and divorced women. Single women is a more heterogeneous group, 
and their autonomy most likely depends on whether they live alone or together with other family 
members such as parents or brothers. Is it therefore difficult to have any a priori opinion on the 
autonomy of the single women in our sample. 
 The estimated parameters associated with working in the wage sector in Table 5.2 show that 
“money matters” in getting women into the labor force. The parameter θ, which measures the impact 
of wages on the work decision, is significantly positive for all groups. As expected, married women’s 
labor supply is much more responsive to wage than for the other groups, and the smallest response is 
found among the divorcees.  
 Since by (4.17) the parameter θ is inversely proportional to the standard error of the random 
terms in the utility function, the estimate of θ given in Table 5.2 imply that unobserved population 
heterogeneity in tastes is much less for married women than for the other groups. This is also reflected 
in the fact that as much as 49 per cent of the “variation” in the data is explained by the model (as 
measured by McFadden’s ρ2, cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) while the corresponding number is 28 
per cent for widowed and only about 10 per cent for the two other groups. 
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Table 5.2. Parameter estimates of choice probabilities. Women 20-60 years of age 
  All women Married  Widowed Divorced Never married 
  coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
Constant   -1.779 -6.8 -1.402 -5.3 -1.259 -4.6 -0.851 -2.8 Parameters 
associated with 
Sector 1  
( )*
10
,α θ   
Log wage  
rate θ 
  
2.645 15.5 2.513 5.1 1.294 5.8 1.233 6.2 
Constant -1.288 -5.4         
Incomplete 
basic 
0.030 0.5         
Basic  0.115  1.3         
Secondary  0.323  2.5         
Post-secondary 0.199 0.7         
Experience/10  0.223  2.0         
Parameters 
associated with 
Sector 2  
( )
20 2
,α α%  
2
(Experience)
100
 0.001 0.0         
Age/10   -0.513 -3.4 -0.749 -4.3 -0.829 -4.4 -0.235 -1.1 
(Age)2/100    0.094  4.5  0.122  4.8  0.133  4.7  0.038  1.0 
# Children < 5 
years 
  0.150 6.2 0.232 2.2 0.118 1.1 -0.133 -1.2 
Log non-labor 
income 
   0.029  4.2  0.075  4.1  0.096  3.9  0.050  2.4 
Husband 
present 
  0.266 6.3       
Parameters 
associated with 
preferences 
(γ) 
Moslem    0.449  8.9  0.513  4.1  0.390  2.8  0.266  1.7 
Constant -0.688 -3.0         
Incomplete 
basic 
0.008 0.1         
Basic -0.089 -0.8         
Secondary  0.272  2.0         
Post-secondary 0.513 4.0         
Experience/10  0.226  2.1         
2
(Experience)
100
 -0.020 -1.0         
Regional 
unemployment 
-0.173 -1.9         
Parameters 
associated with 
choice 
constraints
( )*
0 1
logm ,δ − δ  
Fighter -0.181 -1.5         
Number of observations 4415 2642 513 640 620 
Log likelihood -3971.65 -1871.57 -515 -800.876 -784.2 
McFadden's ρ2 0.35 0.49 0.28 0.10 0.09 
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Table 5.3. Observed (obs.) versus predicted (pred.) fractions. Per cent of women 20-60 years of 
age 
  All women Married  Widowed Divorced Never married 
  obs. pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. 
Unemployed  0.087 0.086 0.051 0.058 0.086 0.067 0.133 0.118 0.175 0.170 
Not in the labor force 0.600 0.588 0.735 0.722 0.558 0.545 0.298 0.319 0.401 0.372 
Wage employee 0.177 0.164 0.119 0.105 0.167 0.156 0.328 0.262 0.263 0.296 
Weighted 
Self-employed 0.136 0.161 0.095 0.115 0.189 0.232 0.242 0.301 0.161 0.161 
Unemployed  0.079 0.079 0.051 0.052 0.074 0.066 0.128 0.118 0.150 0.166 
Not in the labor force 0.610 0.612 0.753 0.752 0.538 0.542 0.309 0.319 0.374 0.377 
Wage employee 0.152 0.151 0.088 0.088 0.154 0.160 0.261 0.264 0.308 0.294 
Un-
weighted 
Self-employed 0.159 0.158 0.108 0.108 0.234 0.232 0.302 0.299 0.168 0.163 
 
 Consistent with the discussion above, we assume that the logarithm of the reservation wage 
depends on age, age squared, number of children less than 5 years old, dummies for religion and the 
presence of husband, and the logarithm of non-labor income. Turning to the parameters associated 
with the reservation wage, (γ), we note that the demographic variables have the expected signs. Age 
shows a U-shaped relationship to the reservation wage. As may be expected, the impact on the 
reservation wage of small children is higher for widowed women than for married women. However, 
it is surprising that the effect is significant for divorced women who we would expect have less access 
to relatives who can look after the children than widows have. For married women, whether the 
husband lives in the household or is away on labor migration, matters a great deal for her preferences 
to stay out of the labor market. As expected, religion has a large impact on women’s labor force 
participation. 
 Non-labor income has a positive effect on the reservation wage, and thus contributes to 
keeping women out of the labor force. The effect is 3 times as high for divorcees and widows 
compared to married women. This is consistent with Bertrand et a1., (1999), who report that whereas 
men’s labor supply fell as a response to increased household non-labor income in South Africa, their 
wives’ labor supply was unaffected. The offered explanation is that married women do not get access 
to this income because they lack bargaining power. This is consistent with our finding that labor 
supply response is related to autonomy (as measured by marital status). 
 The choice constraints―the job opportunities facing each individual―are not assumed to be 
related to marital status, as we do not believe that employers use marital status as a hiring criterion 
(nor did we include marital status as a determinant of wages or profits). The variables that affect the 
number of opportunities (m) are assumed to be level of education, local unemployment rate and fighter 
status. 
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 Whether or not the woman has been a liberation army guerilla fighter seems not to affect her 
opportunities. The unemployment rate is not highly significant for the choice set of job opportunities. 
Recall, however, that since we only have cross sectional data we are unable to identify the impact of 
temporal variations in the unemployment rates.  
 The estimated effect on available job opportunities of having an incomplete basic education 
is slightly negative and the effect of completing basic school slightly positive, but neither is 
statistically significantly different from zero. However, the effect of secondary and higher education is 
strongly positive. Hence, the estimated parameters show that basic education does not contribute to an 
increase in the available job opportunities, and that women need to complete a senior secondary or 
higher education in order to expand the opportunity set available to them.  
6. Selected policy simulation experiments 
The properties of the estimated model are illustrated by a simulation experiment reported in Table 6.1. 
The upper part of the table reports the effect of a 10 per cent increase of the wage rate. We see that the 
female labor force participation rate increases from 41.2 to 43.6 per cent, as slightly more than 2 per 
cent of the women who were inactive now decides to enter the labor force, but 0.6 per cent end up as 
unemployed. The number of women working as wage employees increases by 2.3 per cent, of which 
0.5 per cent has switched from self-employment. 
 In Table 6.1 we also report the corresponding wage elasticities. Recall that the supply 
consists of those who work in Sector 1 and those who would like to work (in Sector 1) but cannot find 
work. The elasticities are aggregate ones in the sense that they measure the percentage effect on the 
respective aggregates (for example the number of women employed in the wage sector) of percentage 
changes in wage rates. We see that the wage elasticity for married women is 1.92, which is at the high 
end of the comparative results reported in Mincer (1985) ranging from 0.5 to 2 with a mean at 1. 
Widows have an elasticity close to this average, whereas the wage elasticities in the wage sector for 
divorced and never married women are below one, at 0.87 and 0.79. The wage (cross) elasticities for 
supply to the self-employment sector are between -0.29 and -0.45, and do not vary much with marital 
status. 
 The effect of a 10 per cent decrease in non-labor income is rather small as seen from the 
lower part of Table 6.1. The resulting increase in the overall female labor force participation rate is 
only 0.2 per cent. Thus, contrary to what perhaps may be a popular belief, the significance of non-
labor income as a determinant of the reservation wage is, as discussed above, rather limited according 
to our results. 
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 Having established positive effects of education on labor supply, both through behavioral 
response to significantly higher wages and profits, but also increased job opportunities for women 
with secondary or higher education, Table 6.2 provide numerical illustrations of further properties of 
the estimated model by reporting simulations of two examples of education policy. From Table 5.2 we 
see that the two parameters associated with basic schooling are not significant and one of them has the 
wrong sign. In the simulation experiments reported in Table 6.2 these parameters are set equal to zero. 
 
Table 6.1. Results from model simulation of 10 per cent wage increase and 10 per cent reduction 
in non-labor income 
 All women Married Widowed Divorced Never married
. Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Effect of 10 per cent  
increase in the wage rate 
Fraction of wage employee 0.164 0.187 0.105 0.126 0.156 0.186 0.262 0.284 0.296 0.320 
Fraction unemployed 0.086 0.093 0.058 0.066 0.067 0.074 0.118 0.123 0.170 0.175 
Aggregate wage elasticity 
for wage sector supply 
1.35 1.92 1.91 0.87 0.79 
Fraction self-employed 0.161 0.156 0.115 0.112 0.232 0.222 0.301 0.291 0.161 0.156 
Aggregate wage elasticity 
for self-employment 
supply 
-0.33 -0.29 -0.45 -0.32 -0.34 
Female labour force 
participation rate  
0.412 0.436 0.278 0.303 0.455 0.482 0.681 0.698 0.628 0.650 
Female unemployment rate 0.209 0.213 0.207 0.216 0.147 0.154 0.174 0.176 0.271 0.269 
Effect of 10 per cent decrease 
 in non-labor income 
Fraction of wage employee 0.165 0.166 0.105 0.106 0.157 0.158 0.262 0.263 0.296 0.297 
Fraction unemployed  0.086 0.086 0.058 0.058 0.067 0.067 0.118 0.119 0.170 0.170 
Aggregate non-labor 
income elasticity for wage 
sector supply 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 
Fraction self-employed  0.161 0.162 0.115 0.116 0.232 0.235 0.301 0.303 0.161 0.162 
Aggregate non-labor 
income elasticity for self-
employment supply 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 
Female labour force 
participation rate 
0.412 0.414 0.278 0.280 0.455 0.460 0.681 0.684 0.628 0.629 
Female unemployment rate 0.209 0.208 0.207 0.206 0.147 0.146 0.174 0.173 0.271 0.271 
 
In the first simulation we introduce a policy of universal basic education, i.e. we “give” basic 
education to all women in our sample who have no schooling or incomplete basic education. The 
resulting employment structure is displayed for the affected group―the sub-sample of women with 
less than basic education―and for the total female labor force. In order to isolate the effect of 
increasing wages from that of increased opportunities we report in a separate column the effects when 
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choice constraints are kept constant. The interpretation of this is that, as labor supply to the wage 
sector increases, the set of job opportunities in the wage sector increases such that, on average, the 
individual choice sets of feasible jobs remain unchanged. 
 Table 6.2 shows that introducing universal basic education for women has a large impact on 
the employment pattern for the least educated women. The labor force participation rate for women 
who have not completed basic education increases from a very low of 33.1 to a high of 54.2 per cent 
after they complete basic education. The main effect is that the number of wage employees in this 
group increases from 13.1 to 27.3 per cent, while self-employment only increases from 14.3 to 15.9 
per cent. The unemployment rate for the group increases from 17.4 to 20.3 per cent of the labor force. 
Since the group of uneducated women is quite large, this policy measure also has a significant effect 
on the overall female labor force participation rate, which increases from 40 to 55.5 per cent. The 
increase in the number of all women working as wage employees rises from 17.7 per cent to 28.6 per 
cent, and the number of self-employed increases from 13.6 to 15.1 per cent. The aggregate female 
unemployment rate remains practically constant at about 21 per cent of the female labor force. 
 The largest response is found for married women: They constitute by far the largest 
demographic group, have an initially low labor force participation rate and, as we showed above, they 
are highly responsive to wages. Thus their labor force participation rate increases from 26.5 per cent to 
44.3 per cent. In the sub-sample of those who are affected by increased education, the labor force 
participation rate for married women more than doubles from 20 to 43.3 per cent. Recall that basic 
education has no effect on the sets of job opportunities.  
 The second simulation presented in Table 6.2 introduces universal secondary education for 
women. When all women in our sample who have left school before grade 12 or who have never 
attended school are “given” secondary education, the female labor force participation rate increases 
from 40 to 76.5 per cent and the employment gap between married women and other women declines 
substantially.  
 In line with the significant impact of secondary education on employment opportunities that 
was established in Table 5.2, we find that increased job opportunities play a major role in explaining 
the employment effect in the wage sector of compulsory secondary education. When opportunity sets 
are kept constant, the per cent of women who work as wage employees increases from 17.7 to 52.5 per 
cent, but when opportunity sets are allowed to increase as a result of increased educational level, 57.9 
per cent of the women will work in the wage sector. Keeping opportunity sets constant produce effects 
that are smaller than when opportunities are allowed to increase as a result of additional education. 
The reason is that (on average) job opportunity sets will increase as the level of education increases, 
which implies that the total effect of increased level of schooling will be smaller when opportunity sets 
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are constrained compared to the unconstrained case. Moreover, we observe that when opportunities 
are restricted we get a somewhat higher participation rate in the self-employment sector, and a 
substantially higher female unemployment rate at 16.7 instead of 9.9 per cent of the labor force. 
 
Table 6.2. Model simulation of two education policy options: universal basic school and 
universal secondary school. Employment pattern before (before) and after (after) 
policy, and when opportunities are kept constant (after
*
) 
 All women Married Divorced 
 Before After After* Before After After* Before After After*
Introducing universal basic  
education, effect on subsample  
affected (women with no or  
incomplete basic education) 
Fraction unemployed  0.058 0.110  0.040 0.100  0.100 0.128  
Fraction wage employee 0.131 0.273  0.065 0.210  0.301 0.381  
Fraction self-employed 0.143 0.159  0.092 0.128  0.267 0.278  
Female labor force participation 
rate  
0.331 0.542  0.200 0.433  0.666 0.787  
Female unemployment rate  0.174 0.203  0.202 0.232  0.148 0.163  
Introducing universal basic 
education, effect on whole sample 
(all women) 
Fraction unemployed 0.087 0.119  0.051 0.102  0.133 0.134  
Fraction wage employee 0.177 0.286  0.119 0.224  0.328 0.385  
Fraction self-employed 0.136 0.151  0.095 0.117  0.242 0.266  
Female labor force participation 
rate  
0.400 0.555  0.265 0.443  0.702 0.784  
Female unemployment rate  0.218 0.214  0.192 0.231  0.190 0.170  
Introducing universal secondary  
education, effect on subsample  
affected (women with less than 
sec. education) 
Fraction unemployed 0.077 0.071 0.132 0.047 0.069 0.130 0.130 0.067 0.132 
Fraction wage employee 0.145 0.594 0.533 0.083 0.573 0.512 0.303 0.600 0.535 
Fraction self-employed 0.141 0.110 0.129 0.093 0.089 0.103 0.255 0.196 0.229 
Female labor force participation 
rate  
0.363 0.775 0.793 0.223 0.731 0.745 0.689 0.863 0.896 
Female unemployment rate  0.212 0.091 0.166 0.210 0.094 0.174 0.189 0.078 0.148 
Introducing universal secondary 
education, effect on whole sample 
(all women) 
Fraction unemployed 0.087 0.076 0.130 0.051 0.071 0.127 0.133 0.069 0.130 
Fraction wage employee 0.177 0.579 0.525 0.119 0.562 0.506 0.328 0.600 0.539 
Fraction self-employed 0.136 0.111 0.127 0.095 0.089 0.102 0.242 0.194 0.225 
Female labor force participation 
rate 
0.400 0.765 0.782 0.265 0.721 0.735 0.702 0.863 0.894 
Female unemployment rate 0.218 0.099 0.167 0.192 0.098 0.172 0.190 0.080 0.145 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a particular modeling framework for structural analysis of labor 
supply. This framework allows preferences to depend on non-pecuniary job opportunity aspects and 
also accommodates for observed and unobserved rationing on agents’ market opportunities. The 
model has been estimated on a sample of Eritrean women. The estimated model has been applied to 
conduct selected policy simulation experiments. These simulation experiments may be useful for 
identifying possible policy interventions with the purpose of increasing the economic activity level in 
Eritrea by mobilizing more women into the labor force, and for improving the earnings capacity of the 
many female household heads in Eritrea through job opportunities and incomes. 
 From the simulation experiments we are able to draw the following conclusions: (i) The 
returns to schooling are high in the wage sector and much higher than in the self-employment sector. 
(ii) While basic schooling seems to have negligible effect on the set of job opportunities in the wage 
sector, the corresponding effects of secondary, and in particular post-secondary schooling, are 
substantial. (iii) The own wage elasticities for the wage sector are rather high, especially for women 
that are married or widowed, while the income elasticities are very small. (iv) Women’s behavior are 
influenced by the lack of autonomy, where the degree of autonomy in the model is represented 
through marital status and type of religion of the household. 
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Appendix A 
 
 Proof of Theorem 1: 
 Under the IIA assumption, Strauss (1979), Theorem 6, has demonstrated that one can, 
without loss of generality, assume that the joint distribution of the random terms 1j , j M,ε ∈  2ε  and ε3 
have the structure 
(A.1) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 j 32y yy1j 1j 2 2k 3 3
j Mj M
P y y y e e e
− −−
∈∈
   
 θε ≤ θε ≤ θε ≤  =ψ + +   
  
∑I I I  
where θ > 0 , is a suitable constant and ψ(⋅) is a positive and decreasing function on R+ such that (A.1) 
is a well defined multivariate distribution function. We realize that the random terms are independent 
when (x) exp( x)ψ = − . 
 Recall that J denotes the index of the most preferred jobs in M. It follows from (A.1) that the 
joint distribution of ( )RW,F (0),W′%  is given by 
(A.2)   
( )
( )
( )0 1 1 0 2 2 0 3 3
1 2 R 3
10 1 1 1 1j 1 2 2 2 2 0 3 3 3
j M
u y v y v y
P logW y , logF (0) y , logW y
P d X max y , logg (0) X y , X y
e e e
∈
γ + − γ + − γ + −
′θ ≤ θ ≤ θ ≤
 ′= θ α + + α θ + θ ε ≤ θ + α θ + θε ≤ γ + θγ + θε ≤ 
 
= ψ + +
%
 
where ( )1 10 1 0 1 1u logm d X ,= + θ α + − γ + α θ  2 0 2 2v logg (0) X′= θ − θγ + α θ  and v X3 3= θγ . From 
(A.2) it now follows immediately from Strauss (1979) that 
(A.3) ( )( )
3
31 2
v
R vu v
e
P W max F (0),W ,
e e e
′> =
+ +
%  
(A.4) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
1
31 2
u
R R vu v
e
P W max W ,F T P W max W ,F (0)exp
e e e
+κ
′ ′> = > κ θ =
+ +
% %  
and 
(A.5) ( )( )
2
31 2
v
R vu v
e
P F (0) max W,W ,
e e e
′ > =
+ +
%  
which prove (4.8) through (4.10). Similarly, (4.12) follows. 
 To prove (4.11) note that 
38 
(A.6) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )R R RP F (0) W max F T ,W P F (0) W W ,W F T P F (0) W W .′ ′ ′ ′ ′> > + > > < = > >% % % %  
Moreover, since ( )F T F (0)′ ′≤  with probability one, it must be true that 
(A.7) ( )( ) ( )( )R RP F (0) W W ,W F T P F T W W .′ ′ ′> > < = > >% % %  
When (A.6) and (A.7) are combined we thus get 
(A.8) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )R R RP F (0) W max F T ,W P F (0) W W P F T W W .′ ′ ′ ′> > = > > − > >% % %  
From Strauss (1979), Lemma, p. 47, we obtain that 
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3 31 2 1
v u
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%  
When (A.9) and (A.10) are inserted into (A.8), (4.11) follows. 
 Eq. (4.13) follows from (A.9) and an expression analogous to (A.10) (obtained by 
interchanging W%  and WR), and the fact that the events 
 { } ( ){ }R RF (0) W W and F T W W′ ′> > > >% %  
are disjoint. We notice that the choice probabilities are independent of ψ. Thus, one can without loss 
of generality choose x(x) e−ψ = , which implies independent error terms. This completes the proof of 
Theorem 1. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 From the results above we realize that we could have chosen (x) exp( x)ψ = − , (which means 
that the random error terms are i.i.d.), since ψ cancels in the expressions for the choice probabilities.  
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 Proof of Lemma 1: 
 We have that 
(A.11) 
( ) ( )
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1J 1 1
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E h 0 E logW h 0 ElogW
E logW logW max logW ,logF T ElogW.
ε > = > −
′= > −
% %% %
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From (A.1) we get, similarly to (A.2); 
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where 
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From (A.13) it follows that 
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With the change of variable, x y= − λ ,  
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 ( )x x 1j
R
x e e dx E 0
− −′− ψ = θε =∫  
it follows that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x x x x
R R
x e e dx e e dx | e .
∞
− − − − −
−∞
′ ′− + λ ψ = −λ ψ = λ ψ = λ∫ ∫  
Moreover, (4.9) implies that 
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1
u
1
e
e
P h 0
λ
=
>
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. 
Hence, (A.15) becomes 
(A.16) 
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y x x
1 R R
e
y exp y e dy x e e dx .
P h 0
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Consequently, (A.11) and (A.16) yield 
(A.17) ( ) ( )1J 1 1 1E h 0 ElogW u logP h 0 .θε > = λ − = λ − = − >% %%  
Similarly to the results of Theorem 1 we notice that (A.16) is independent of ψ. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Note that even if Strauss (1979) has proved that the transformation ψ cancels in the 
derivation of the choice probabilities, his result does not immediately hold for our case since we allow 
for simultaneous choice of wage work and self-employment. Furthermore, we also need to prove 
Lemma 1, which proof is not found elsewhere as far as we know. 
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Appendix B 
 
In this appendix we outline the derivation of the likelihood function. Let i 1,2,...,=  represent the 
indexation of the individuals in a random sample. Let Pi00, Pi10, Pi01 be the individual choice 
probabilities as given by (4.15), (4.17) and (4.18). Let 
i00
Y , Yi10, Yi01, Yi11 and Vi10 be indicator 
variables representing the individuals labor market status, i.e. 
i00
Y  is equal to one if individual i does 
not wish to work and zero otherwise, Yi10 is equal to one if individual i works solely in Sector 1 and 
zero otherwise, Yi01 equals one if individual i works solely in Sector 2 and zero otherwise, and Yi11 
equals one if individual i works in both sectors, and Vi10 equals one if individual i wish to work in the 
wage sector but cannot obtain work in this sector. Let *ijh  denote hours of work in Sector j, j 1,2,=  
when there is no rationing in Sector 1. From (4.16) to (4.21) it follows that 
(B.1) ( )
i1 i i 2 2
i00 i1 i2 Z Z
1
P : P h h 0
1 e e
β β
= = = =
+ +
% %  
(B.2) ( )
i1 1
i1 1 i 2 2
Z
i10 i1 i2 Z Z
e
P : P h 0,h 0
1 e e
β
β β
= > = =
+ +
% %  
(B.3) ( )
i 2 2 i 2 2 i1 1
i1 1 i 2 2 i1 1 i1 1 i 2 2 i1 1
Z Z Z
i01 i1 i2 Z Z Z Z Z Z
e 1 e e
P : P h 0,h 0
1 e e 1 e 1 e e 1 e
β β +κ β
β β β β β +κ β
= = > = ⋅ + ⋅
+ + + + + +
% %  
(B.4) ( )
*
i1 1
*
i1 1 i 2 2
Z
* * *
i10 i1 i2
Z Z
e
P P h 0,h 0 ,
1 e e
β
β β
≡ > = =
+ +
 
(B.5) ( )
*
i2 2 i 2 2 i1 1
* * * *
i1 1 i 2 2 i1 1 i1 1 i 2 2 i1 1
Z Z Z
* * *
i01 i1 i2
Z Z Z Z Z Z
e 1 e e
P : P h 0,h 0
1 e e 1 e 1 e e 1 e
β β +κ β
β β β β β +κ β
= = > = ⋅ + ⋅
+ + + + + +
 
where 
(B.6) 
* *
i1 1 10 i1 1 i3
Z : logm X X ,β = θα + + α θ − γθ%  
(B.7) 
i1 1 10 0 i4 i1 1 i3
Z : X X Xβ = θα + δ + δ + α θ − γθ%  
and 
(B.8) 
i2 2 20 i2 2 i3
Z : X X .β = θα + α θ − γθ%  
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It follows that 
(B.9) ( ) *i10 i10 i10P V 1 P P= = −  
and 
(B.10) ( ) *i00 i00 i10 i10P Y 1 P P P .= = − +  
The log-likelihood function equals 
(B.11)
( ) ( ) ( )( )* *i00 i00 i10 i10 i10 i10 i10 i10 i10 i01 i01 i11 i00 i10 i01
i
logL Y log P P P V log P P Y logP Y logP Y log 1 P P P .= − + + − + + + − − −∑
 
When 
i11
Y 0=  for all i it must be the case that  
 ( )i1 i2P h 0,h 0 0.> > =% %  
But then (4.11) implies that 0κ =  in which case 
i01
P reduces to 
i01
P% , given by 
 
i 2 2
i1 1 i 2 2
Z
i01 Z Z
e
P : .
1 e e
β
β β
=
+ +
%  
The likelihood function in this case becomes 
(B.12) ( ) ( )( )* *i00 i00 i10 i10 i10 i10 i10 i10 i10 i01 i01
i
logL Y log P P P V log P P Y logP Y logP .= − + + − + +∑ %  
 
